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Legislating Labors of Love:
Revisiting Commercial Surrogacy in New York
DEBORAH MACHALOW*
In 1978, Louise Brown, the first baby conceived through in vitro fertilization
(IVF),1 changed the world. Doctors first considered fertilization outside a woman’s
body in 1934,2 and it has since become a medical mainstay.3 Since 1978, around
five million children worldwide have been born through assisted reproductive
technology (ART).4 In IVF, eggs are retrieved from a woman’s ovaries and
fertilized in a lab. The resulting embryos are transferred into the uterus of either the
woman who produced the eggs or of another woman.5 This procedure has had
drastic implications on the law of surrogacy contracts.6
Surrogacy provides a pathway to genetic parenthood for people who cannot
achieve a successful pregnancy on their own.7 A surrogate
is a woman who, for financial and/or compassionate reasons, agrees to
bear a child for another woman who is incapable or, less often,
unwilling to do so herself . . . she is a substitute or tentative mother in
that she conceives, gestates and delivers a baby on behalf of another
woman who is subsequently seen as the real mother of the child.8
Intended parents, the surrogate, and sometimes the surrogate’s husband enter a
contract that dictates the parameters of the surrogacy.9 Typical intended parents are
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possible—family, friends, mentors, and ILJ colleagues.
1. SUSAN L. CROCKIN & HOWARD W. JONES, JR., LEGAL CONCEPTIONS: THE EVOLVING
LAW AND POLICY OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 1 (2010).
2. Timeline: The History of In Vitro Fertilization, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
americanexperience/features/timeline/babies.
3. Id.
4. Eliana Dockterman, Reproductive Medicine’s Gift: 5 Million Babies, TIME (Oct. 16,
2013), http://healthland.time.com/2013/10/16/reproductive-medicines-gift-5-million-babies/.
In fact, 2.5 million of these babies have been born in the past six years alone. Id.
5. See Austin Caster, Don’t Split the Baby: How the U.S. Could Avoid Uncertainty and
Unnecessary Litigation and Promote Equality by Emulating the British Surrogacy Law
Regime, 10 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 477, 481 (2011).
6. While surrogacy raises complex concerns, such as commercialization,
commodification, and the right to procreate (to name a few), these issues have been
thoroughly examined elsewhere. Devising overarching conclusions about surrogacy’s
societal impact is outside the purview of this Note.
7. Richard J. Arneson, Commodification and Commercial Surrogacy, 21 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 132, 145 (1992). In many cases, the resulting children are only related to their intended
father. See JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 257 n.30 (1994).
8. Anton van Niekerk & Liezl van Zyl, The Ethics of Surrogacy: Women’s
Reproductive Labour, 21 J. MED. ETHICS 345, 345 (1995) (internal quotations and
parentheticals omitted).
9. See Janice C. Ciccarelli & Linda J. Beckman, Navigating Rough Waters: An
Overview of Psychological Aspects of Surrogacy, 61 J. SOC. ISSUES 21, 22 (2005).
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Caucasian, heterosexual, married, and financially secure.10 They want a genetic
connection to their children, so they pursue surrogacy.11 Surrogates are often
married mothers in their twenties or thirties who are white, Christian, and working
class.12 Surrogacy agencies often screen potential applicants to prevent
exploitation.13
Prior to the widespread acceptance and use of IVF, ART became “more familiar
and, with familiarity, . . . seemed less threatening” over time.14 Originally, when
parties entered a surrogacy contract, the intended surrogate would be inseminated
by the intended father’s sperm. She would be the biological and birth mother of any
resulting child. This is referred to as traditional surrogacy.15 This genetic
connection, as highlighted in the Baby M case,16 prompted New York and other
states to ban commercial surrogacy contracts, lest parent-child ties be coercively or
hastily severed.17
In gestational surrogacy, the surrogate is the “oven” for another woman’s
“bun,” so there is no genetic connection between the carrier and child.18 The
growing standardization and acceptance19 of IVF allows the gestational carrier to
be just that—the carrier.20 Here, the intended mother is often the child’s21 genetic

10. See id. at 35. It is not surprising that most intended parents are financially secure; in
2005, the average cost to intended parents for a surrogacy arrangement ranged from $25,000
to $100,000. Id. at 36.
11. Id. at 35.
12. Id. at 31. Surrogates used by the Center for Surrogate Parenting (one of the most
respected surrogacy agencies) are typically middle class, married with two or three
biological children, Christian, working class, often employed part-time, have some college
education, but not a degree, and live in suburbs or small towns. Leslie Morgan Steiner, Who
Becomes a Surrogate?, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/
health/archive/2013/11/who-becomes-a-surrogate/281596/. Nationally, they tend to have
household incomes of less than $60,000. Id.
13. Id.
14. Elizabeth S. Scott, Show Me the Money: Making Markets in Forbidden Exchange:
Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 137
(2009).
15. See, e.g., Brittnay M. McMahon, The Science Behind Surrogacy: Why New York
Should Rethink Its Surrogacy Contracts Laws, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 359, 361 (2011).
16. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1248 (N.J. 1988)
17. McMahon, supra note 15, at 362.
18. McMahon, supra note 15 at 363. The use of donor eggs has increased over time. In
1996, 2000 IVF cycles used donated eggs; this figure increased to over 17,000 in 2000 in the
United States. Susan Golombok, Jennifer Readings, Lucy Blake, Polly Casey, Alex Marks,
& Vasanti Jadva, Families Created Through Surrogacy: Mother-Child Relationships and
Children’s Psychological Adjustment at Age 7, 47(6) DEV. PSYCH. 1579 (2011). Further, the
use of donor eggs has continued to increase. Lindsey Tanner, Donor Egg Pregnancies on the
Rise, US Study Finds, YAHOO! NEWS (Oct. 17, 2013), http://news.yahoo.com/donor-eggpregnancies-rise-us-study-finds-135419857.html;_ylt=A2KJ3CS5.35SRDIAGfbQtDMD.
19. Scott, supra note 14, at 137–38.
20. “[S]urrogate mothers do not generally indicate that the babies belong to them;
rather, they feel they are providing a meaningful and valuable service for the intended
parents.” Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Roundtable on Regulating Assisted Reproductive
Technology 2012: Mothering for Money: Regulating Commercial Intimacy 88 IND. L.J.
1223, 1230 (2013). This is particularly true with regards to gestational surrogates, who lack
a genetic relationship to the children. Id. at 1231. Interestingly, there is no medical “evidence
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mother, or, when an intended mother cannot produce ova, donor eggs can be used.
Even though the surrogate gestates the fetus, the removal of this biological
connection should sever the surrogate’s legal parental rights.22
Infertile couples’ reliance on surrogacy has increased over time,23 yet the law
has not kept up with technology and parental desires.24 As reliance increases,
variations on the basic surrogacy model become more complex.25 Parties may
increasingly swap their genetic material out for gametes from persons outside the
surrogacy agreement. For example, a surrogacy arrangement could involve five
“parents”: genetic mother (egg donor), surrogate, intended mother, genetic father
(sperm donor), and intended father.26 Many states, including New York, take an
outdated approach to surrogacy contracts and thus create ineffective protections for
intended parents and surrogates.27 Surrogacy is at the center of legislative and
policy debates; the time is ripe for reexamination of state surrogacy law in light of
changes to technology and desire for access to these developments.28 Other states
of a biological basis for bonding” during gestation. STEINBOCK, supra note 1, at 209. In fact,
the gestational surrogates themselves “heavily emphasize genetics.” Laufer-Ukeles, supra at
1231. Contra Radhika Rao, Hierarchies of Discrimination in Baby Making?: A Response to
Professor Carroll, 88 Ind. L.J. 1217, 1221 (2013) (decrying "unthinking stereotypes and
prejudices that endow genes with greater significance than other biological connections and
envision a gestational surrogate as a mere 'carrier' and not the real mother.").
21. For the ease of communication in this Note, the singular “child” generally denotes
the plural “children.”
22. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (where no biological link between
carrier and fetus, there is no bond and no parental rights should attach); McMahon, supra
note 15, at 636.
23. Golombok, supra note 18, at 1579. By the middle of 1992, approximately 4000
children had been born through surrogacy agreements across the United States. Kevin Sack,
New York Is Urged to Outlaw Surrogate Parenting for Pay, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1992, at
B5. At least 1600 children were born through the use of a gestational surrogate between
1991 and 1999. Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 9, at 23. The CDC began requiring
reporting on the success of IVF cycles in 1992, but did not require separate reporting for
gestational surrogacy until 2003, so it is likely more children were born through gestational
surrogacy than this number reflects. Id. In the United States, between 2004 and 2008, the
number of babies born through gestational surrogacy increased eighty-nine percent.
MAGDALINA GUGUCHEVA, CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS, SURROGACY IN AMERICA 3
(2010),
available
at
http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/pagedocuments/
kaevej0a1m.pdf. Between 2007 and 2012, the use of gestational surrogates increased by
twenty-eight percent. Susan K. Livio, Christie Vetoes Bill that Would Have Eased Tough
Rules for Gestational Surrogates, NJ.COM (Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.nj.com/politics/
index.ssf/2012/08/christie_vetoes_bill_that_woul.html.
24. See CROCKIN & JONES, supra note 1, at 374, 384.
25. Id. at 384.
26. See ROBERT BLANK & JANNA C. MERRICK, HUMAN REPRODUCTION, EMERGING
TECHNOLOGIES, AND CONFLICTING RIGHTS 99 (1995). In most cases, the egg and sperm
donors have waived their rights at gamete retrieval. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.14
(West 2013) (requiring gamete or embryo donor relinquish parental rights to resulting
children unless partaking in an adoption or surrogacy arrangement). Contra N.Y. TASK
FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY (2011) [hereinafter
TASK FORCE], available at http://www.health.ny.gov/regulations/task_force/reports_
publications/execsum.htm.
27. See TASK FORCE, supra note 26.
28. See Judy Callman, Surrogacy – A Case for Normalization, 14 HUM. REPROD. 277
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have seized this opportunity to amend their regulatory regimes; it is time for New
York to follow suit and do the same.
This Note will place recent New York proposals to reform the prohibitory
surrogacy law regime in larger contexts, both nationally and state-specifically.29
Part I provides an overview of the surrogacy regimes across the United States and
examines a few recent proposals. Part II provides a historical discussion of New
York’s prohibitions. Part III describes the proposals to liberalize the state’s
surrogacy regime. Part IV recommends improvements to these and future
legislative proposals.30 Approval of reform legislation would acknowledge
developments in ART and bring law into alignment with intended parents’ desires.
I. AMERICAN REGULATION OF SURROGACY
The beauty of federalism is that states can take different approaches to a single
issue. “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”31
This is clear regarding surrogacy regulations: the different approaches form a
continuum—from absolute prohibition, to moderate regulation, to approval. Even
within this continuum, approaches vary. There are also some states that eschew
legislation, relying solely on common law.
States that permit surrogacy have adopted diverse regulatory mechanisms. Some
states distinguish between traditional and gestational surrogacy;32 some distinguish
between commercial and altruistic surrogacy;33 some provide surrogacy as an
option only for married couples;34 some permit surrogacy only where it is
medically indicated.35
(1999). In the past two years Arizona, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Louisiana,
Maryland, New Jersey, and South Dakota, in addition to New York, have all considered
revisions to their surrogacy law regimes. See H.B. 2081, 51st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz.
2013); 79 Del. Laws 88 (2013); B2-0032, 2013–2014 Council, 20th Period (D.C. 2013);
H.B. 433, 2013 Reg. Sess. (La. 2013); H.B. 1099, 2013 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2013); S.B. 1599,
215th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2012); S.B. 2032, 215th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1(b) (N.J. 2013);
H.B. 1218, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2011); H.B. 1255, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2012);
H.B. 1094, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2013).
29. Seeing as this is the Indiana Law Journal Supplement, I’d be remiss to not address
Indiana specifically. In 1997, Indiana’s legislature added Sections 31-20-1-1 and -2
declaring that surrogacy agreements were against public policy and that those entered after
March 14, 1988 are void. Recently, Indiana has not attempted to change its policy on
surrogacy. New York provides a more interesting case study.
30. Since drafts of the legislation are substantively the same, this evaluation will be
done together.
31. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
32. For example, Illinois only permits gestational surrogacy contracts to be enforceable.
See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/15 (2006).
33. For example, Washington only prohibits commercial surrogacy; it is the
compensation to which the state objects as violative of public policy. WASH. REV. CODE.
§26-26-240 (2013). Similarly, Nebraska, while proclaiming surrogacy contracts “void and
unenforceable,” only prohibits commercial surrogacy, as it defines “surrogate parenthood
contracts” as contracts “by which a woman is to be compensated for bearing a child of a man
who is not her husband.” NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21, 200 (2013).
34. For example, Nevada, while providing that the intended parents “be treated in law as

2014]

LEGISLATING LABORS OF LOVE

5

An absolute prohibition on surrogacy contracts outlaws the creation and
prevents enforcement of traditional and gestational surrogacy contracts. There are
presently five states that completely ban surrogacy: New York, North Dakota,
Michigan, Indiana, and Arizona.36 These states proclaim that surrogacy contracts
violate public policy.37
Below is a brief description of some recent attempts to change state surrogacy
regimes.
A. Recent Proposals
New York was not the only state whose legislature recently considered
proposals attempting to repeal or revise surrogacy prohibitions. New Jersey,
Maryland, and South Dakota are some of the jurisdictions that recently considered
revisions to their surrogacy laws, while Delaware successfully amended its
surrogacy regime.38
1. New Jersey
In 2012, the New Jersey legislature considered two bills regarding surrogacy
contracts. The first recognized and enforced gestational surrogacy agreements
because they were “in accord with the public policy of [the] State.”39 In response,
opponents introduced another bill, asserting that surrogacy contracts were “in direct
conflict with numerous public policies of the State.”40 This bill included criminal
penalties for those involved in the arrangement or execution of a surrogacy
contract, including doctors and brokers, as well as to those who sought or offered to
pay a surrogate.41 Intended parents who entered noncommercial surrogacy
contracts could receive severe civil penalties.42 The surrogate herself would be
subject to civil penalties, unless she showed a “genuine willingness” to accept the
resulting child and she “repudiate[d] the agreement in writing within 120 days” of
the child’s birth.43 The birthmother would have a presumption of primary
. . . natural parent[s] under all circumstances,” NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.045(2) (2013),
limits who may enter into a valid surrogacy contract; Nevada limits the intended parents to
persons “whose marriage is valid” in Nevada and who provide the “egg and sperm” for the
“assisted conception.” Id. § 126.045(1), (4).
35. For example, Illinois requires at least one of the intended parents “have a medical
need for the gestational surrogacy as evidenced by a qualified physician’s affidavit.” 750
ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20 (2006); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (2013) (requiring an
intended mother be unable to safely carry a pregnancy to term); VA. CODE ANN. § 20160(B)(8) (2010) (requiring that the intended mother be unable to bear a child).
36. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (2013); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-20-1-1 (2013); MICH.
COMP. LAWS §§ 722.853, 722.855, 722.857 (2013); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 122, 123, 124
(2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05 (2013).
37. See IND. CODE. § 31-20-1-1 (2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.855 (2013).
38. See supra note 28.
39. S.B. 1599, 215th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2(a) (N.J. 2012).
40. S.B. 2032, 215th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1(b) (N.J. 2013).
41. Id. §§ 3, 4.
42. The penalty for a first offense would range from $30,000 to $50,000; those penalties
would jump to between $50,000 and $80,000 for a second offense. Id. § 4.
43. The penalties range from $10,000 to $70,000, depending on how many times she
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permanent custody (barring risk of harm to the child) with the intended parents
possibly receiving “parenting time.”44
Ultimately, although the legislature had approved liberalization of the surrogacy
laws that would have given custody to the intended parents at birth, eliminated the
three-day wait period between birth and the intended parents being listed on the
birth certificate,45 and provided a comprehensive scheme of enforcement,46
Governor Christie vetoed the bill. He explained that allowing surrogacy contracts
“unquestionably raises serious and significant issues” and the legislature had not
examined the effect on the traditional family extensively enough.47 After the veto,
the proposal was abandoned, leaving New Jersey’s strict surrogacy regime intact.48
2. Maryland
Maryland’s Collaborative Reproduction Act49 was introduced to standardize the
state’s surrogacy laws and to provide protections for intended parents and
surrogates. It would permit enforcement of surrogacy contracts that conformed to
its required standards.50
The Act set out eligibility requirements for surrogates and intended parents. The
most notable requirements for surrogates are that they must have been approved by
a mental health professional and a reproductive endocrinologist51 and they must
have had at least one live child.52 Similarly, intended parents would need prior
approval after medical and psychological evaluation53 and “have guaranteed
payment” of all expenses to be able to participate in a surrogacy arrangement.54
The Act also set out procedural55 and substantive requirements for the contract.
The gestational carrier and her partner must agree to follow medical advice,56
surrender custody of the child at birth,57 aid the intended parents in getting
custody,58 comply with other negotiated terms in the contract,59 and disclaim legal

had committed the offense. Id. § 5.
44. Id. §§ 6, 7.
45. Id.
46. N.J. S.B. 1599.
47. Id.
48. Livio, supra, note 23.
49. H.B. 1099, 2013 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2013).
50. Id. § 5-905.
51. Id. § 5-906(A)(1)(III)–(IV).
52. Id. § 5-906(A)(1)(II). Otherwise, surrogates must be at least twenty-one, id. § 5906(A)(1)(I); and be independently represented, id. § 5-906(A)(1)(V). The Act would permit
intended parents to pay legal fees. Id. § 5-906(A)(2).
53. Id. § 5-906(B)(2)–(3).
54. Id. § 5-906(B)(5). The Act would permit a variety of ways of paying expenses. Id.
Further, the proposal would require allocation of expenses if the contract or pregnancy was
terminated. Id. Intended parents also must be independently represented. Id. § 5-906(B)(4).
55. The contract must be in writing, notarized, and signed before embryo transfer. Id. §
5-907(A)(1). If not notarized, the signatures must be otherwise verified. Id. The surrogate,
her husband and the intended parents all must sign. Id.
56. Id. § 5-907(B)(1)(I).
57. Id. § 5-907(B)(1)(III).
58. Id. § 5-907(B)(1)(IV).
59. Id. § 5-907(B)(V).
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custody of the child.60 The intended parents must agree to accept the child at birth
regardless of its condition.61 The Act would require reimbursement of “reasonable
medical and ancillary expenses,” but prohibit other payments.62 Like other
legislative proposals, in case of dispute, Maryland’s would prohibit specific
performance if it would require impregnating the surrogate.63
The proposal would permit petitions for parentage to be filed at any time after
pregnancy is achieved.64 If the petition is sufficient, the court would establish
parentage65 and require a birth certificate to reflect the child’s legal parentage.66
Unlike most other regulations of surrogacy, Maryland’s proposal would only seal
the proceedings at the request of the intended parents.67 At the end of the legislative
session, the Collaborative Reproduction Act remained stalled in a Maryland House
Committee.68
3. South Dakota
South Dakota’s recent history with surrogacy is one of contradictory attempts
but no success. In 2011 and 2012, legislation was proposed to prevent enforcement
of surrogacy contracts.69 In 2013, competing legislation was proposed to enforce
certain surrogacy contracts.70 To date, none of the bills have been approved.
The 2011 bill defined surrogacy broadly71 and declared it violative of public
policies. It proposed severe penalties for surrogacy participants.72 Further, the

60. Id. § 5-907(B)(II).
61. Id. § 5-907(B)(2). This would include “paying for any funeral expenses if there is a
stillbirth, preterm birth, or any other birth issue that results in the child’s death.” Id. § 5907(B)(2)(II).
62. Id. § 5-901(P). The ancillary expenses could include “expenses for maternity
clothes, legal and counseling expenses, actual lost wages, child care expenses, housekeeping
expenses, intangible expenses associated with risk, inconvenience, forbearance, or restriction
from usual activities, postpartum recover expenses, and travel expenses” related to the
agreement. Id. § 5-907(C)(1). Expenses are presumed to be reasonable if specified in the
contract and the contract was negotiated by attorneys. Id. § 5-907(C)(2)–(3).
63. Id. § 5-910(C)(1). However, the proposal would permit specific performance if the
surrogate refused to relinquish the child, if the intended parents failed to take custody or if a
party failed to cooperate in proceedings to establish legal parentage of the intended parents.
Id. § 5-910(C)(2).
64. Id. § 5-911(A). A court has jurisdiction if an intended parent or a surrogate has been
a resident of the state for at least 90 days, the resulting child is expected to be born in the
state, or the embryo transfer is performed in the state. Id. § 5-911(B). The petition itself must
include affidavits from the petitioner’s attorney, the reproductive endocrinologist, and the
attorneys representing all parties to ensure compliance with the proposed legislation and a
copy of the agreement. Id. § 5-911(C).
65. Id. § 5-911(D).
66. Id. § 5-911(F).
67. Id. § 5-911(G).
68. Status of all House Legislation Introduced 2013 Session, MD. LEGISLATURE (June
12, 2013), http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/Pubs-Current/Current-House-Status-Report.pdf.
69. H.B. 1218, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2011); H.B. 1255, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(S.D. 2012).
70. H.B. 1094, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2013).
71. House Bill 1218 Section 2(1) provides:
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surrogate would be granted primary physical custody of the resulting child unless
evidence showed she was unfit or would pose a serious risk to the child’s wellbeing.73 Intended parents would presumptively be granted visitation or parenting
time unless such arrangement would not be in the child’s best interests.74
Regardless of custody or visitation, the intended parents would be responsible for
supporting the child and for paying for both the surrogate’s medical expenses and
the child’s medical expenses following birth.75
The 2012 proposal was in some ways stricter and in some ways more lenient
than the 2011 proposal. The 2012 proposal would only prohibit commercial
surrogacy agreements, yet it also proclaimed “[n]o surrogacy agreement is
enforceable.”76 While it increased the sanctions against physicians who helped
execute surrogacy agreements,77 it decreased the punishments for other
participants.78 Otherwise, its provisions were substantially similar to the 2011
proposal.79
The 2013 proposal sought to permit enforcement of gestational surrogacy
contracts by mandating that children born to gestational carriers are the children “of
the intended parents for all purposes and [are] not [children] of the gestational
carrier” or her husband.80 However, enforcement would be limited to contracts
meeting specified requirements.81 The proposal also had eligibility requirements for
[A]n arrangement, whether or not embodied in a contract, written or oral,
entered into by two or more persons, including the mother, sometimes referred
to as the ‘surrogate’ or ‘gestational carrier’ or ‘surrogate uterus’, [sic] and an
intended rearing parent or parents, who agree, prior to insemination, or in the
case of an implanted embryo, prior to embryo transfer or embryo implantation,
to participate in the creation of a child, with the intention that the child will be
reared as the child of one or more of the intended parents, other than the
mother.
72. Id. §§ 3–6, 10 (subjecting participants to felonies, fines ranging from $30,000 to
$80,000, and reports to the Board of Medical and Osteopathic Examiners).
73. Id. § 8. Even if the child is not presently in her possession, if the surrogate seeks
custody, it will be granted to her after notifying the people in whose custody the child is.
Concerns about the surrogate’s fitness cannot be raised until the child has been turned over
to her. Id. Further, when the custody arrangement is being finalized, the presumption that the
surrogate should maintain custody can only be overcome by proving, by clear and
convincing evidence, that “the mother fails to meet minimal parenting standards necessary to
satisfy the basic needs and welfare of the child.” Id. § 9. However, that determination cannot
“be based on consideration of economic or social class.” Id.
74. Id. § 11.
75. Id. §§11, 12.
76. S.D. H.B. 1255 § 4.
77. House Bill 1255 would presume that any licensed professional who “induces,
arranges, procures, or otherwise assists in the formation of a commercial surrogacy
arrangement” and who either pays or is paid for such services committed an act of
“unprofessional conduct.” Id. §§ 5, 6.
78. The proposal decreased the classifications for first– and second–time offenses for
brokers and their staff from felonies to misdemeanors. S.D. H.B. 1255. Further, this proposal
did not include punishments for intended parents or surrogates.
79. Cf. S.D. H.B. 1218, with S.D. H.B. 1255.
80. S.D. H.B. 1094 § 5.
81. The gestational carrier and the intended parents must be independently represented,
id. § 9(3), the contract must be executed before the start of the IVF cycle, id. § 9(2), and the
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surrogates82 and for intended parents.83 In case of breach, the courts would
determine rights and obligations but could not order specific performance where it
would impregnate the gestational carrier.84 Further, this proposal would not enforce
traditional surrogacy arrangements.85 At the time of writing this Note, this proposal
is tabled by the Judiciary Committee.86
4. Delaware
In 2013, Delaware passed the Gestational Carrier Agreement Act to enforce
surrogacy contracts and to protect their parties’ interests.87 The legislation
authorizes an agreement between a woman and another person, an
unmarried couple, or a married couple in which the woman
relinquishes all rights as a parent of a child conceived by means of
assisted reproduction, and which provides that the person or married
or unmarried couple become the parents of the child.88
Further, the Act permits a judgment of parentage prior to birth by filing a
petition that meets specified requirements.89 Delaware’s law mandates eligibility
requirements for surrogates90 and intended parents.91 The contract must meet its
contract must be written and signed before two witnesses, id. §§ 9(1), 9(6). Further, the
contract must be accompanied by written acknowledgements from the intended parents and
the gestational carrier that they received information about their rights and obligations under
the contract. Id. § 9(4). If the gestational carrier is married, her husband must agree to the
contract. Id. § 10(2). Notably, an agreement that includes provisions limiting the gestational
carrier’s actions, requiring the gestational carrier undergo medical procedures, compensating
the carrier, or offering to reimburse the carrier is still enforceable. Id. § 11.
82. The gestational carrier must be over twenty-one, id. § 7(1); have delivered a child
previously, id. § 7(2); have undergone medical and psychological evaluations, id. § 7(3), (4);
and possess health insurance until eight weeks postpartum, id. § 7(6).
83. The intended parents must complete a psychological evaluation, id. § 8(3); have a
medical need for a gestational carrier, id. § 8(2); and at least one of the intended parents
must be genetically related to the embryo, id. § 8(1). It appears that the statute’s wording
only permits an individual to be an intended parent if there is a genetic relationship, which
would not confer intended parent status to individuals who use donor gametes.
84. Id. §§ 15, 16.
85. “Any agreement in which a woman agrees to become a surrogate and to relinquish
that woman’s rights and duties as parent of a child conceived through assisted conception is
unenforceable.” Id. § 3. “Surrogate” is defined as “an adult woman who enters into an
agreement to bear a child conceived through assisted conception, using her own egg, for
intended parents.” Id. § 1(4).
86. S.D. LEGISLATURE, H.B. 1094 BILL HISTORY, available at http://legis.sd.gov/
Legislative_Session/Bills/Bill.aspx?Bill=1094&Session=2013.
87. 79 Del. Laws 88 (2013).
88. Id. § 8-103(d).
89. The petition must clearly identify the parties and be accompanied by affidavits
detailing that the pregnancy was achieved through ART, verifying the intended parents’
intent, verifying the surrogate and her spouse’s lack of parentage, and asserting that the
agreement complied with the statute. Id. § 8-611(b).
90. A surrogate must be at least twenty-one, id. § 8-806(a)(1); have delivered at least
one child, id. § 8-806(a)(2); have completed mental and medical evaluations, id. § 8806(a)(2)–(3); obtain health insurance for the duration of the pregnancy and eight weeks
postpartum, id. § 8-806(a)(6); and be independently represented, id. § 8-806(a)(5). Her legal
costs can be paid by the intended parents. Id.
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own set of procedural requirements.92 Further, the contract must expressly detail
the parties’ duties93 and that the surrogate selects her medical providers.94 Clauses
restricting the surrogate’s activities, requiring medical procedures, and
compensating her do not nullify the contract.95 All remedies at law or equity are
available, but specific performance cannot be ordered to impregnate the
surrogate.96 Intended parents must support the resulting child, even if they breach
the contract.97 The governor signed this legislation on July 3, 2013.
II. HISTORICAL NEW YORK REGULATION OF SURROGACY
The New Jersey Supreme Court decision in Matter of Baby M98 sparked a
legislative maelstrom in New York regarding the legality and enforceability of
commercial surrogacy agreements. This turbulence culminated in the passage of
New York’s existing prohibitions. Nearly twenty years later, during the 2011–2012
and 2013–2014 legislative sessions, New York had four legislative proposals to
reform its surrogacy laws.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the American public’s ire was drawn by the
infamous Baby M case,99 in which a traditional surrogate decided she did not want
to give the resulting child to the intended parents.100 The ensuing legal battle
captured the nation’s attention101—shaping the discussion of surrogacy and leading
to public concern and resistance.102 This was clearly seen in New Jersey’s sister
91. An intended parent must be independently represented, id. § 8-806(b)(2), and have
completed a mental health exam, id. § 8-806(b)(1).
92. The contract must be written and signed by the parties and their spouses, id. § 8807(b)(1)–(2); executed before transfer, id. § 8-807(b)(2); accompanied by written
confirmations that the parties were informed, id. § 8-807(b)(4) (acknowledging they
“received information about the legal, financial, and contractual rights, expectations,
penalties, and obligations of the gestational carrier agreement.”); and be witnessed by two
disinterested adults, id. § 8-807(b)(6).
93. Id. § 8-807(c)(1), (4). If the surrogate is married, her spouse must agree to the
contract. Id. § 8-806(c)(2).
94. Id. § 8-807(c)(3).
95. Id. § 8-807(d).
96. Id. § 8-810.
97. Id. § 8-804(b). Interestingly, planning on a genetic link to the child is sufficient for a
predetermination of parentage. For example, intended parents who plan to have a genetic
link to the child but are foiled by a laboratory mix-up resulting in a non-genetic embryo
being transferred are still the legal parents—unless a genetic parent sues within sixty days of
the child’s birth. Id. § 8-804(c).
98. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
99. Scott, supra note 14, at 117–20; Matter of Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
100. Baby M., 537 A.2d at 1236.
101. See Lisa Belkin, Surrogate Law vs. Last Hope of the Childless, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 28,
1992, at B1; Caster, supra note 5, at 497.
102. See Emily Gelmann, “I’m Just the Oven, It’s Totally Their Bun”: The Power and
Necessity of the Federal Government to Regulate Commercial Gestational Surrogacy
Arrangements and Protect the Legal Rights of Intended Parents, 32 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP.
159, 163 (2011). Interestingly, some feminists and social conservatives found themselves in
agreement on surrogacy. While some feminists saw surrogacy as an exercise of a woman’s
right to contract, others saw it as an opportunity for the commodification of women. This
latter group opposed surrogacy on that principle. Meanwhile, social conservatives opposed
surrogacy because they feared it would lead to the breakdown of the traditional nuclear
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state New York, whose attempts at surrogacy regulation were as chaotic and mixed
as the nation’s views on surrogacy itself.
Back then, the surrogacy market was booming in New York; estimates
suggested forty percent of the 4000 surrogate births in the United States occurred
there.103 The surrogacy market involved for-profit brokers who, for a fee of around
$16,000, would match intended parents to willing surrogates.104 The typical
contract would provide the surrogate with compensation between $10,000 and
$20,000 for a live birth, plus out-of-pocket medical expenses.105 Some contracts
required the surrogate to abort if the fetus was abnormal.106 Others detailed a
prorated compensation schedule if the pregnancy did not result in a live birth.107
After birth, the surrogate would relinquish the child to its biological father, whose
wife would legally adopt the baby.108 Courts were willing to enforce these
commercial surrogacy contracts into the mid-1980s.109
Popular responses to surrogacy in general—and commercial surrogacy in
particular—varied greatly. Some were supportive of the idea conceptually, but
concerned about it in practice and especially wary of commercialization.110 For
example, N.Y. State Senator John J. Marchi pronounced, “We find this an affront
to human decency to continue the practice of commercial parenting.”111 Many
viewed surrogacy as equivalent to prostitution.112 Others deemed commercial
surrogacy a form of “baby selling” that “demeans and threatens women.”113
Prior to this outpouring of rage, the New York State Legislature saw a flurry of
legislative proposals regarding surrogacy. Between 1984 and 1992, twenty-one
bills on the subject were introduced by ten legislators.114 A series of public hearings
was conducted to solicit constituents’ opinions.115 The first hearing, cosponsored
by the Assembly and Senate Judiciary Committees, was held in October 1986 to
determine whether regulation was necessary.116 The Senate Judiciary Committee
then recommended enforcement of surrogacy contracts as the best way to safeguard
children’s interests and that regulation was the appropriate avenue.117 This
grounded the most high-profile legislation of the period—a proposal in each
family. See Scott, supra note 14, at 111–17.
103. Belkin, supra note 101, at B1, B3.
104. Id. at B3.
105. Id.
106. Of course, enforcement of such provisions would be questionable under Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (the right to privacy ensures a woman the right to terminate
her pregnancy); accord BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 26, at 117.
107. Belkin, supra note 101, at B3.
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., In re Baby Girl L.J., 505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Nassau Co. Sup. Ct. 1986). The
surrogate agreed to be artificially inseminated with intended father’s sperm and to relinquish
the resulting child for a fee. The court upheld the adoption of the child. Id. at 817–18.
110. Sack, supra note 23, at B5.
111. Id.
112. Van Niekerk & van Zyl, supra note 8, at 345.
113. See Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 9, at 22.
114. SUSAN MARKENS, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD AND THE POLITICS OF REPRODUCTION
39 (2007).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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legislative house to “regulate surrogate parenthood,”118 proposed by Senators
Dunne and Goodhue.119
The proposed legislation required parties be independently represented and
undergo psychological counseling, mandated medical exams and health insurance
for the biological father and surrogate,120 and required prior court approval of the
surrogacy contract, including surrogate compensation.121 In April and May of 1987
the N.Y. Senate Committee on Child Care held public hearings to discuss the
bill,122 where a majority supported surrogacy.123 At the time of the first meeting,
according to a public poll, sixty-nine percent of people believed surrogate parenting
contracts should bind surrogates.124
Despite this overwhelming support, “a coalition of religious groups, adoption
and child-welfare advocates, and women’s groups” halted the legislators’ efforts,125
and the legislation died in committee.126 In 1987, two bills were introduced to make
all surrogacy contracts unenforceable or to ban commercial surrogacy; the
following year, four additional bills were introduced.127
At that point, Governor Mario Cuomo stepped into the developing quagmire and
directed a task force to examine surrogacy and make legislative
recommendations.128 The Task Force on Life and the Law recommended, in no
uncertain terms, that all surrogacy be discouraged and that surrogacy contracts be
unenforceable.129 The recommendation was to prohibit commercial surrogacy and
its brokerage while discouraging noncommercial surrogacy.130 Governor Cuomo
accepted the Task Force’s recommendations, with legislators in both houses
proposing legislation to effectuate this recommendation in 1988.131 A fourth public
hearing was held in December 1988,132 resulting in nearly forty people presenting a
total of seven hours’ worth of testimony.133 But this legislative proposal, too, failed
to survive the committee process.134
The 1989–1990 legislative session showed surrogacy was still a hot issue;135
five more proposals were introduced, all of which “declared surrogacy contracts

118. James Feron, Testimony is Given on Surrogate Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1987, at
A39; MARKENS, supra note 114, at 40.
119. MARKENS, supra note 114, at 39.
120. Id. at 40.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 39.
123. Id. at 40; Feron, supra note 118.
124. See Feron, supra note 118.
125. Scott, supra note 14, at 118.
126. MARKENS, supra note 114, at 40.
127. Id.
128. McMahon, supra note 15, at 365.
129. See id.
130. MARKENS, supra note 114, at 40.
131. Id.at 40–41.
132. Id. at 41.
133. Id.
134. Id. Of the nine proposals in 1987–1988, a grand total of none survived the
legislative process; none escaped committee. Id.
135. The continuing legislative fascination can partially be attributed to the fact that two
of the nation’s twenty-nine “surrogate parenting centers” were located in New York,
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void and unenforceable.”136 Included in these proposals was a reiteration of
Cuomo’s legislation that included criminal penalties for surrogate contract
brokerage.137 Again, none became law.
The 1991–1992 session saw five surrogacy-related bills, four in opposition to
surrogacy contracts.138 The odd-bill-out was introduced at the end of the legislative
session by two fervent surrogacy proponents, Assemblymen Koppell and
Balboni.139
In 1992, the legislature enacted a bill declaring surrogacy contracts “contrary to
the public policy of [New York],” as well as “void and unenforceable.”140 The
legislature created civil penalties for those who “knowingly request, accept,
receive, pay or give any fee, compensation or other remuneration, directly or
indirectly, in connection with any surrogate parenting contract, or induce, arrange
or otherwise assist in arranging a surrogate parenting contract for a fee,
compensation or other remuneration.”141 The surrogate, her husband, and the
intended parents could receive monetary penalties of up to $500.142 For brokers, the
monetary penalty is up to $10,000 plus the fee charged for arranging the
contract.143 These penalties do not apply when payments result from an otherwiseapproved adoption or from medical costs of a mother, which are “incurred in
connection with the birth of the child.”144 Ultimately, the bill was approved 59–0 in
the Senate and 104–39 in the Assembly.145 This made New York the eighteenth
state to limit surrogacy.146
Thus, as it stands, New York does not penalize the formation of noncommercial
surrogacy contracts but will not enforce any surrogacy contracts. These contracts
can be for either traditional or gestational surrogacy.147 The law does not provide a
way to resolve disputes between a genetic mother and a surrogate.148 Thus, a
gestational surrogate can be given parental rights to a nongenetic child, who would
not exist but for the surrogacy agreement.149 However, trial courts can determine
maternity and paternity without adoption proceedings.150
including the one that arranged the contract resulting in Baby M. Sack, supra note 23, at B5.
136. MARKENS, supra note 117, at 43.
137. Id. at 43–44.
138. Id. at 44. Interestingly, one of these antisurrogacy bills went much further, stating
that “all in vitro pregnancies” were contrary to public policy and thus unenforceable.
CROCKIN & JONES, supra note 1, at 229–30.
139. MARKENS, supra note 114, at 44.
140. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (McKinney 2013). By definition, all surrogacy
contracts, meaning both commercial and noncommercial, are unenforceable under § 122;
however, § 123 actually penalizes only parties to commercial surrogacy agreements.
141. Id. § 123-1.
142. Id. § 123-2(a).
143. Id. § 123-2(b). Anyone caught coordinating a surrogacy contract a subsequent time
is “guilty of a felony.” Id.
144. See id. (exempting altruistic surrogacy from the enumerated penalties).
145. MARKENS, supra note 114, at 45.
146. Belkin, supra note 101, at B1. At the time, New York joined Washington, Virginia,
Utah, Oregon, Oklahoma, North Dakota, New Jersey, New Hampshire, Nevada, Nebraska,
Michigan, Louisiana, Kentucky, Indiana, Florida, Arizona, and Arkansas. Id.
147. TASK FORCE, supra note 15.
148. Id.
149. See id. New York has determined, as a matter of law, that the biological mother of a
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PRESENT PROPOSALS TO REFORM NEW YORK SURROGACY LAW

In the over twenty years since the enactment of the surrogacy prohibitions, four
bills have been introduced to the New York State Legislature to lift the ban on
commercial surrogacy contracts.
New York Senate Bill No. 2547 (“S.B. 2547”), initially introduced on January
18, 2013 by Senator Hoylman, would allow “loving and committed couples [to]
have every opportunity to raise and nurture their own genetically linked children—
including the utilization of . . . gestational surrogate parenting contracts.”151 The
legislation, however, would simply repeal Article Eight of the Domestic Relations
Law,152 and does not provide any regulatory language for commercial surrogacy
contracts,153 and would thus permit contracts in any form.154 In April 2013, Senator
Hoylman also introduced the far more specific New York Senate Bill No. 4617
(“S.B. 4617”), twin to New York Assembly Bill 6701 (“Assem. B. 6701.”).155
Assem. B. 6701, introduced in April 2013 by nineteen assembly members,
would improve couples’ access to surrogacy by allowing the creation of
enforceable commercial surrogacy agreements,156 permitting preemptive judgment
of parentage,157 and creating guidelines for the termination of surrogacy
contracts.158 When intended parents pay their surrogates consideration beyond
reasonable expenses, Assem. B. 6701 requires them to escrow the funds before the
start of the cycle.159 This compensation must be “reasonable,” established through
good-faith negotiation, and based on the service provided, expenses incurred, time
used, and inconvenience encountered.160 It cannot be used to “purchase gametes or
embryos” nor “for the relinquishment of a parental interest in a child.”161
The legislation also specifies who may enter into a surrogacy agreement.162 A
surrogate must be at least twenty-one years old,163 have had a medical evaluation
child conceived through use of a donor egg is the birth mother. Id.
150. T.V. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, 929 N.Y.S.2d 139, 144 (2011); see Doe v. N.Y.
City Bd. of Health, 782 N.Y.S.2d 180, 184 (Sup. Ct. 2004). Contra Feigenbaum v. N.Y.
State Dept. of Health, No. 2009-019430 slip op at 4 (Suffolk Co. Sup. Ct. Oct. 22, 2010).
151. BRAD HOYLMAN, SPONSOR MEMORANDUM 2013 NY S.B. 2547, at 1 (Jan. 23, 2013)
[hereinafter SPONSOR MEMO].
152. S.B. 2547, 236th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013).
153. See id.
154. See infra Part IV for recommended changes to the proposals. Similarly, the Sponsor
Memo refers to its legislation as “the first step” towards allowing intended parents to pursue
genetically related children through medical technology and protecting their rights upon
entering valid commercial surrogacy contracts. SPONSOR MEMO, supra note 151, at 2.
155. S.B. 4617, 236th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013). Because of the substantive
similarities, the two proposals will be discussed in tandem. The afore-referenced 2012
proposal was this legislation’s predecessor, however it was significantly altered prior to
reintroduction in 2013. As such, it will not be separately addressed.
156. Assem. B. 6701, 236th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 581-401 (N.Y. 2013).
157. Id. § 581-203.
158. Id. § 581-406.
159. Id. § 581-405(a)(6). The payments must conclude within eight weeks of the end of
pregnancy. Id. § 581-502(b).
160. Id. § 581-502(a)–(b).
161. Id.
162. Id. § 581-404.
163. Id. § 581-404(a)(1).
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“relating to the anticipated pregnancy,”164 consult with independent legal counsel
about the contract’s expectations and obligations,165 and either have or obtain
health insurance before the cycle that will cover “major medical treatments and
hospitalizations” throughout the pregnancy and for eight weeks postpartum.166 The
intended parents167 must have consulted with independent legal counsel about the
expectations and obligations of the surrogacy contract.168 An intended married
parent must be not be legally separated from his or her spouse.169
In order for a surrogacy agreement to be enforceable, it must be in writing and
signed by the intended parent and the surrogate170 prior to the start of the cycle.171
The surrogate retains the right to choose her medical providers throughout the
pregnancy.172 By signing, the surrogate agrees “to undergo embryo transfer and
attempt to carry and give birth to the child” and to give the child’s custody to the
intended parents at birth.173 The intended parents must agree to “accept custody of
all resulting children immediately upon birth regardless of number, gender, or
mental or physical condition” and to be solely responsible for their upkeep, care,
and maintenance.174
The legislation would allow a “judgment of parentage” prior to the birth of a
child resulting from a surrogacy contract.175 The petition may be filed any time
after the contract’s execution.176 It must meet procedural requirements.177 The court

164. Id. § 581-404(a)(2).
165. Id. § 581-404(a)(3).
166. Id. § 581-404(a)(4). The intended parents could provide insurance as part of the
surrogacy contract. Id.
167. New York would permit individuals and unmarried couples to enter into surrogacy
agreements as intended parents. Id. § 581-404(b)(1), (2). For the ease of communication,
throughout the remainder of the Note, “intended parents” generally refers to single and
coupled intended parents.
168. Assem. B. 6701 § 581-404(b)(1) (N.Y. 2013).
169. Id. § 581-404(b)(2). However, if the intended parent has been separated from his or
her spouse for over three years before the formation of the agreement, then the spouse does
not have to be involved in the contract and is unable to receive parental rights through the
surrogacy contract. Id. § 581-404(b)(2)(ii).
170. Id. § 581-405(a)(1). If the surrogate is married prior to execution of the contract, her
spouse must be a party to the contract, id., and the parties must meet the eligibility
requirements discussed above. Id. §§ 581-404, 405(a)(3), 405(a)(4). If the surrogate gets
married between contract’s execution and its completion, the new spouse does not have to
sign the contract and is not presumed to be a parent of the child. Id. § 581-407.
171. Id. § 581-405(a)(2). This does not include the required medical examination.
172. Id. § 581-405(a)(7)(i)(C). She is to consult with the intended parents, but they
otherwise have no say in which the surrogate chooses. Id.
173. Id. §§ 581-405(a)(7)(i)(A)–(B).
174. Id. §§ 581-405(a)(7)(ii)(A)–(B). The statute also requires the intended parents
acknowledge that these rights and responsibilities “are not assignable.” Id. § 581405(a)(7)(ii)(C).
175. Id. § 581-201(c)(ii), 203.
176. Id. § 581-203(a).
177. The petition must include a statement that the intended parents or the surrogate had
resided in N.Y. for over 90 days, id. § 581-203(b)(1); an attorney certification that the
parties are eligible and that the contract meets the statutory requirements, id. § 581203(b)(2); and a statement that the parties entered the agreement “knowingly and
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then predetermines parentage, awarding legal parenthood to the intended parents at
birth178 and records the decision.179 The “proceedings, records, and identities” of
the parties are sealed unless the parties petition.180 The intended parents’
willingness to pay the surrogate “reasonable compensation” more than “reasonable
medical and ancillary costs” of pregnancy will not bar parentage judgments.181 If
intended parents do not pursue and obtain a judgment of parentage, legal parentage
is assigned based on “the best interests of the child.”182 The original court with
jurisdiction over the matter maintains exclusive jurisdiction until the child is 180
days old.183
Finally, Assem. B. 6701 provides for mechanisms to terminate an executed
surrogacy agreement.184 The intended parents can terminate the contract after
judgment of parentage, but before the surrogate is pregnant, simply by providing
written notice to the other parties and filing with the court to vacate the judgment
of parentage.185 Unless otherwise detailed in the contract, “all remedies available at
law or equity” can be sought and granted except for specific performance to
impregnate the surrogate.186 The trial court is responsible for resolving disputes
arising from the contract and determining “the respective rights and obligations of
the parties.”187
IV.

EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSALS

The present prohibitory surrogacy regime in New York has failed to keep up
with developments in ART. This is unsurprising considering the legislature
approved the statute in 1993—a mere seven years after the first baby from a
gestational surrogacy arrangement in the United States was born.188 Gestational
surrogacy was developed after traditional surrogacy because gestational surrogacy
requires more advanced technology than artificial insemination.189 At the time of
passage, traditional surrogacy was the norm;190 however, gestational surrogacy is
now far more common.191 Notably, the current legislation draws no distinction
between the two.
voluntarily,” id. § 581-203(b)(3).
178. Id. § 581-203(c).
179. Id. § 581-203(c)(5).
180. Id. § 581-410.
181. Id. § 581-203(d).
182. Id. § 581-408. When the court is making this determination, the statute specifically
provides it should consider “genetics and the intent of the parties.” Id.
183. Id. § 581-411.
184. Id. § 581-406.
185. Id. § 581-406(a)–(b).
186. Id. § 581-409(b)–(c).
187. Id. § 581-409(a).
188. Denise E. Lascarides, A Plea for the Enforceability of Gestational Surrogacy
Contracts, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1221, 1226 (1997).
189. LYNDA BECK FENWICK, PRIVATE CHOICES, PUBLIC CONSEQUENCES: REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY AND THE NEW ETHICS OF CONCEPTION, PREGNANCY, AND FAMILY 215 (1998).
190. Id.
191. See Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine,
Consideration of the Gestational Carrier: A Committee Opinion, 99 FERTILITY & STERILITY
1838, 1838 (June 2013) [hereinafter ASRM Opinion] (clinics reluctant to perform traditional
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The interests of all potential parties to surrogacy contracts should be considered
when drafting laws to govern surrogacy. New York’s law fails to keep up with the
desires of intended parents. Many couples discover they are infertile when they try
to start families in their thirties.192 They often find that adoption is not a viable
option, as there are fewer children than intended parents on the adoption market,
and the parents may be deemed too old by adoption agencies.193 Also, adoption
does not provide a genetic link between child and parents. Surrogacy solves both
issues by providing the possibility of a genetic link between parent and child and
by facilitating the creation and placement of children. Further, unlike other aspects
of ART, which are covered by medical insurance in a few states,194 surrogacy is
paid almost entirely out-of-pocket. Despite the statutory prohibitions, over five
percent of gestational surrogacy contracts are executed in New York.195
New York’s restrictiveness on surrogacy is surprising considering its typical
role as a trailblazer on social issues.196 Liberalizing laws on surrogacy is the right
decision. While S.B. 2547 would accomplish this by simply removing the statutory
prohibition, the proposal is inadequate as it does not provide any regulatory support
or guidance.197 S.B. 4617 and Assem. B. 6701 are drastic improvements on the
status quo, but they are imperfect. This Part evaluates the proposals in context of
existing law and policy, with an eye towards improving the legislation.
A. Enforceability
Mandating the enforceability of surrogacy arrangements is the right legislative
decision.
The Constitution provides support for enforcing surrogate parenting contracts—
whether commercial or altruistic.198 These supports include the right to privacy, the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the penumbra of the Bill of Rights.199 The Due
Process Clause supports freedom of contract, with prohibitions on unconscionable
surrogacy arrangements); Erin Y. Hisano, Gestational Surrogacy Maternity Disputes:
Refocusing on the Child, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 517, 524 (2011) (gestational surrogacy
increased from less than five percent to over fifty percent of surrogacy arrangements
between 1988 and 1994); supra note 22 and accompanying text; Scott, supra note 14, at 122.
192. See BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 26, at 111.
193. Id.
194. Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Texas all require
insurance companies cover the costs of IVF. Jennifer Gunning, Regulating ART in the USA:
A Mixed Approach, in THE REGULATION OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY, 55, 61
(Jennifer Gunning & Helen Szoke eds., 2003).
195. GUGUCHEVA, supra note 23, at 15.
196. See, e.g., Nicholas Confessore & Michael Barbaro, New York Allows Same-Sex
Marriage, Becoming Largest State to Pass Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 25, 2011, at A1; Thomas
Kaplan, Sweeping Limits on Guns Become Law in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2013, at
A15.
197. Regulation is necessary to prevent peculiar arrangements, such as a surrogate
carrying two embryos for two different sets of intended parents. CROCKIN & JONES, supra
note 1, at 247.
198. “Constitutional challenges to statutes prohibiting surrogacy have also been brought
and won (in both Arizona and Utah) by couples and gestational carriers arguing that the
statutes violated their constitutional rights.” Id. at 214.
199. Caster, supra note 5, at 502.
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contracts, or those that subjugate others.200 Freely-entered surrogacy contracts
should be treated as other valid contracts—enforceable with the parties’ intent
controlling.201 Arguably, there is a constitutional right to procreate,202 which should
extend from natural to assisted reproduction, as both means seek the same end.203
Additionally, the ability to enter contracts, including surrogacy agreements, is
included in the meaning of personal autonomy; to prohibit such action would
“violate women’s right to self-determination and reinforce the negative stereotype
of women as incapable of full rational agency.”204 Enforcing surrogacy agreements
strengthens self-determination and personal autonomy, as enforcement
“presupposes that the woman’s body is hers and hers alone unless she consents to
some particular use of it.”205 “The argument that a woman cannot knowingly and
intelligently agree to gestate and deliver a baby for intending parents carries
overtones of the reasoning that for centuries prevented women from attaining equal
economic rights and professional status under the law.”206 Women who undertake
to be surrogates are generally “quite satisfied” with their decision.207 Many

200. Id. at 507.
201. Id. at 508.
202. D.M.T. v. T.M.H., No. SC12-261, 2013 Fla. LEXIS 2422, at *24 (Fla. Nov. 7,
2013) (“It is a basic tenant of our society and our law that individuals have the fundamental
constitutionally protected rights to procreate and to be a parent to their children. These
constitutional rights are recognized by . . . the United States Constitution.”); Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (“The liberty interest at issue in this case—the interest of
parents in the care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the
fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”); TASK FORCE, supra note 26. This
right has been conceptualized as both a positive and a negative right. ART creates “a claim
on society to guarantee, through whatever means possible, the capacity to reproduce.”
BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 26, at 99. However, this could lead to constitutional claims
for access to services and financial assistance. More likely, the right will be conceptualized
as a negative right: the state does not need to provide affirmative support; it just needs to
permit legal access. ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 225 (“Procreative rights are negative in
protecting against private or state interference, but they give no positive assistance to
someone who lacks the resources essential to exercise the right.”). Contra Ann MacLean
Massie, Symposium on John A. Robertson’s Children of Choice: Regulating Choice: A
Constitutional Law Response to Professor John A. Robertson’s Children of Choice, 52
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 135, 162 (1995) (“[T]he cases suggest that the state may
constitutionally regulate reproductive behavior outside the particular context of marital
intimacy.”); see also Radhika Rao, Constitutional Misconceptions, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1473,
1484–87 (1995) (reviewing JOHN A ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE
NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1994)) (“If government need not supply the financial
resources necessary to exercise the right to procreate, it is not clear why government must
supply the judicial resources necessary to exercise the right either.”).
203. See TASK FORCE, supra note 26.
204. Liezl van Zyl & Anton van Niekerk, Interpretations, Perspectives and Intentions in
Surrogate Motherhood, 26 J. MED. ETHICS 404, 404 (2000).
205. Arneson, supra note 7, at 162.
206. Caster, supra note 5, at 512.
207. Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 9, at 31. There is little evidence showing women
are exploited by surrogacy contracts. Jennifer L. Watson, Growing a Baby for Sale or
Merely Renting a Womb: Should Surrogates Be Compensated for Their Services?, 6
WHITTIER J. CHILD. & FAM. ADVOC. 529, 545 (2007).
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surrogates receive an increase in “self-worth” from the experience.208 Prohibitions
on surrogacy are reminiscent of outdated patriarchal doctrines, like coverture.
Legalizing commercial surrogacy contracts furthers women’s independent rights to
make decisions and to contract.209 As in other fields, the right to contract can be
governed by regulations addressing legitimate public policy concerns while still
safeguarding personal autonomy.
Further, enforcing surrogacy contracts would provide social and economic
benefits to the parties involved. Economically, parties would not contract if they
were not to receive a benefit outweighing their investment.210 Without the
agreement being enforceable at the outset, neither intended parents nor surrogates
have a guaranteed incentive, and thus they will be less willing to engage.211
Further, by permitting the enforcement of such contracts, society benefits through
the creation of families.212
B. Eligibility
The New York proposals generally strike an appropriate balance between
preventing exploitive arrangements and safeguarding personal autonomy, however
three additional requirements would further these goals: require the surrogate and
her spouse to undergo psychological and medical exams, require a surrogate to
have previously given birth, and require physical and psychological exams for the
intended parents with the results provided to the surrogate so she can make an
informed decision.
1. Surrogates
The proposed requirements mandating that the surrogate be at least twenty-one
years old,213 have consulted with independent legal counsel214 and possess health

208. Vasanti Jadva, Clare Murray, Emma Lycett, Fiona MacCallum & Susan Golombok,
Surrogacy: The Experiences of Surrogate Mothers, 18 HUM. REPROD. 2196, 2204 (2003).
209. Caster, supra note 5, at 512; Watson, supra note 207, at 545–46.
210. Richard A. Posner, The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate
Motherhood, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 21, 22–23 (1989).
211. Id. at 23 (lacking assurances that the contract will be enforced, intended parents will
not be willing to invest as much money into the agreement, so surrogates are deprived the
ability to set fees according to their needs).
212. There is no adverse effect on the family relationship or the parent-child bond when
children lack a genetic or gestational bond with their parents at age three. See Susan
Golombok, C. Murray, V. Jadva, E. Lycett, F. MacCallum & J. Rust, Non-Genetic and NonGestational Parenthood: Consequences for Parent-Child Relationships and the
Psychological Well-Being of Mothers, Fathers and Children at Age 3, 21 HUM. REPROD.
1918, 1919 (2006).
213. Mandating surrogates be over twenty-one is a valid restraint that presumably is
intended to protect younger women who may not be able to fully understand the seriousness
of a surrogacy agreement. Other states have similar requirements. See, e.g., 79 Del. Laws 88
(2013) (surrogate must be at least twenty-one.); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (2013) (surrogate
must be at least eighteen.). See also ASRM Opinion, supra note 191, at 1840 (“Given the
very complex emotional tasks of the pregnancy and postpartum, as well as the demands of
negotiating a relationship with intended parents, it is reasonable to adopt a conservative
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insurance lasting eight weeks postpartum215 are straightforward and justified
requirements that do not warrant further discussion.
Requiring potential surrogates to have a medical “evaluation and consultation
with a health care provider regarding the anticipated pregnancy”216 is a good start,
but inadequate because it does not require a psychological evaluation.217 The
required consultation protects the physical health of potential surrogates;218
however it does not assess nor protect psychological or emotional wellbeing.
Psychological screening could prevent women prone to surrogacy-induced distress
from participating by identifying those with unstable personalities.219 Additionally,
a mandatory psychological exam, with or without mandatory counseling,220 would
help assuage concerns about coercion, lack of informed consent, and undue
influence.221 Further, ensuring psychological stability would ensure surrogates are
able to “view the child they are carrying as not theirs” and are comfortable
relinquishing the child to the intended parents.222 Intended parents would also be
more comfortable with a surrogate who has a clean bill of mental health, as mental
state can impact pregnancy outcomes.223 Making these steps routine in surrogacy
position about age and surrogacy by setting the minimum age at 21.”).
214. Mandating that the parties be independently represented is common. See, e.g., CAL.
FAM. CODE § 796279 (2013); Del. Laws 88 (2013); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/15 (2006).
215. Such a requirement is logical as recovery from labor and delivery usually takes
around eight weeks. Patient Education Post-Partum, PHYSICIANS FOR WOMEN (2004),
http://www.physicians-for-women.com/patients/postpartum.asp. Insurance can be procured
by the surrogate or intended parents. Assem. B. 6701 § 581-404(a)(4) (N.Y. 2013).
216. Assem. B. 6701 § 581-103(s) (N.Y. 2013).
217. Some states already require a psychological evaluation. See, e.g., 79 Del. Laws 88
(2013) § 8-806(a)(2)–(3); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-803(2)(d) (2013). The 2012 proposal
required the surrogate pass a mental health evaluation. Assem. B. 10499, 235th Leg., Reg.
Sess. § 581-402(A) (N.Y. 2012).
218. Cf. Belkin, supra note 101, at B3. It is logical to require medical examinations to
ensure the surrogate does not communicate a disease to the fetus. CROCKIN & JONES, supra
note 1, at 190. It would also be valuable to require the surrogate’s medical records be
provided to intended parents. See BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 26, at 117 (describing case
where surrogate transferred a potentially lethal strep infection to the fetus she was carrying).
Providing the surrogate’s medical records could alert intended parents to surrogate behavior
that could make her a suboptimal carrier for their fetus. Id.
219. See, e.g., Arneson, supra note 7, at 160. Surrogacy does not lead to psychological
trauma or negative outcomes for willing participants. Jadva, Murray, Lycett, MacCallum &
Golombok, supra note 208, at 2203. Any psychological unease is short-lived and transient in
nature. Id.
220. Providing therapy and other support to surrogates may improve their satisfaction
with the surrogacy process. Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 9, at 34. The 2012 version
required the mental health professional to offer counseling to all participants in the
surrogacy arrangement. Assem. B. 10499 § 581-402(B) (N.Y. 2013). If the evaluation was
unfavorable, further counseling could be used in order to pass the mental evaluation. Id. §
581-402(C).
221. Caster, supra note 5, at 509.
222. Jadva, Murray, Lycett, MacCallum & Golombok, supra note 208, at 2203.
223. See, e.g., Ctr. for Neuroscience in Women’s Health, Pregnancy and Mental Health,
STANFORD SCH. OF MED., http://womensneuroscience.stanford.edu/wellness_clinic/
Pregnancy.html. For example, untreated depression can lead to low birth weight for the
infant and premature or prolonged labor for the surrogate. Id. In cases where mental health
issues are treated, the fetus can be exposed to the medication through the placenta. Id. New
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contract formation would protect all parties by promoting voluntary compliance
and decreasing litigation.224
The surrogate’s partner should also be subject to both a medical and a
psychological exam. The medical evaluation would protect a fetus from
communicable disease225 and provide more information to the intended parents,
allowing them to make informed decisions about the risks to which they are willing
to expose their intended child. Similarly, the psychological exam would provide a
window into the surrogate’s support structure and ensure that her partner
acknowledges and approves of her undertaking.226
Legislation should require surrogates to have already given birth.227 While a
competent woman is the best judge of what she can and cannot handle and whether
to undertake a particular risk, especially when dealing with her own body,228 she
can only do so effectively when able to make an informed decision. Women who
have already had children are better informed as to the nature of pregnancy and can
more easily gauge the likelihood that they will be distressed by the fact that the
fetus developing within her is not hers.229

Hampshire already requires the intended parents receive a copy of a nonmedical evaluation
by a psychologist, psychiatrist, or the equivalent prior to contract formation. N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 168-B:18 (2013). Virginia already requires medical and psychological reports
be accessible for all parties. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(B)(7) (2010). Utah requires
certification that all parties have participated in counseling and have discussed options and
consequences of the contract. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-803(2)(d) (West 2008). Required
sharing of medical and psychological information, even when the surrogate is known to the
intended parents, promotes informed decisionmaking.
224. Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 9, at 34. Further, if the women who are
considering entering into surrogacy contracts are aware that contracts are presumptively
enforceable, they will know their decision is likely irrevocable. This encourages selfselection of surrogates who are comfortable with this outcome. Richard A. Epstein,
Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement, 81 VA. L.R. 2305, 2339 (1995).
225. Cf. CROCKIN & JONES, supra note 1, at 190. Other states already require this. See,
e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(B)(7) (2010). Requiring these evaluations from other
members of the surrogate’s household would be requiring too much.
226. The 2012 version would have required the surrogate’s spouse pass a mental
evaluation as well. Assem. B. 10499 § 581-402(A) (N.Y. 2012). Generally, even where
members of the surrogate’s support network were initially concerned or opposed to the
surrogacy arrangement, by the contract’s conclusion they were often supportive. Jadva,
Murray, Lycett, MacCallum & Golombok, supra note 208, at 2203.
227. Such a requirement can be found in other states’ statutes. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-160. It was also found in the 2012 version of the proposal. Assem. B. 10499 § 581404(A)(2) (N.Y. 2012). See also ASRM Opinion, supra note 191, at 1840 (“To give true
informed consent without the experience of a pregnancy and a delivery is problematic
because of the prolonged, intense, and unique nature of the experience.”).
228. See Kristen Walker, Should There Be Limits on Who May Access Assisted
Reproductive Services? A Legal Perspective, in THE REGULATION OF ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY, 123, 125 (Jennifer Gunning & Helen Szoke eds., 2003).
229. Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 9, at 34; see Jadva, Murray, Lycett, MacCallum
& Golombok, supra note 208, at 2203–04.

22

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL SUPPLEMENT

[Vol. 90:1

2. Intended Parents
The proposals should maintain their liberal eligibility requirements for intended
parents, but they should have to undergo physical and emotional evaluation.230
Intended parents can be married, coupled, or single.231 The proposals maximize
access to parenthood by not placing arbitrary requirements on intended parents,
such as requiring a biological link between an intended parent and the resulting
child,232 or that a medical condition prevent the intended mother from safely
carrying a pregnancy to term.233 Limiting surrogacy contracts to genetically linked
intended parents would unfairly restrict access.234 Similarly, commercial surrogacy
should not be limited to those who physically cannot gestate a pregnancy; it should
be available to women who want to have genetic children but do not want to be
pregnant.235 Society does not require one be physically unable to care for her
parents to hire a nurse, nor that someone be physically unable to stay home and
take care of her children to hire a nanny; anyone can hire other caretakers. This
principle should apply to surrogates. Similarly, surrogacy should be available to
women who do not want to be mommy tracked, thus allowing reproduction to no
longer be a hindrance to women’s careers, possibly allowing more women the
opportunity to enter the upper echelons of government and business by making
their parenting role analogous to a father’s.236
Yet, New York should require physical and psychological examinations for
intended parents, with the results accessible to potential surrogates to provide them
more information to make an informed decision about whether they want to work

230. The 2012 proposal would have required intended parents pass a mental health
evaluation. Assem. B. 10499 §§ 581-402(A), 581-404(B)(1) (N.Y. 2012).
231. Compare Assem. B. 6701 § 581-404(b)(1), (2) (N.Y. 2013) with FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 742.15 (2013), and NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.045(2) (2013). The only restriction is that
a married intended parent cannot be separated from his or her spouse. Assem. B. 6701 §
581-404(b)(2) (N.Y. 2013). However, if the intended parent has been separated for over
three years before the formation of the agreement, then the spouse does not have to be
involved in the contract and is unable to receive parental rights through the surrogacy
contract. Id. § 581-404(b)(2)(ii).
232. Cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. 742.15(3)(e); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(B)(9).
233. Cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15; 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20 (2006); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-160(B)(8).
234. The use of donated genetic material for procreation has become a mainstay in ART.
CROCKIN & JONES, supra note 1, at 190. Donor gametes can be used to create an embryo for
use in a gestational surrogacy contract. See SPONSOR MEMO, supra note 151, at 1.
235
In fact, there has been an increase in the use of surrogacy by women who want to have
children but do not want to be pregnant. ‘Social Surrogacy’ an Option for Moms-to-Be Who
Shun Pregnancy, ABC NEWS (Apr. 18, 2014), http://gma.yahoo.com/blogs/abc-blogs/socialsurrogacy-option-moms-shun-pregnancy-160413402--abc-news-parenting.html.
236. This would, on a micro level, allow women to have it all—a family and a career—
without having to sacrifice one for the other. Eduardo Porter, Motherhood Still a Cause of
Pay Inequality, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2012, at B1 (much of the pay gap between men and
women is caused by motherhood and the constraints it places on their careers), and, on the
macro level, allow society to reap the benefits of female leadership. See, e.g., Sam Bennett,
Who Needs More Women in Government? Everyone., http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sambennett/who-needs-more-women-in-g_b_485685.html (women work collaboratively for
“win-win outcomes,” increasing net benefits to all).
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with these specific people.237 Such examination of the intended parents would help
fulfill the duty of care owed to surrogates and the resulting children by the
surrogacy agency.238 Additionally, the American Society for Reproductive
Medicine (ASRM) strongly recommends psychological evaluations for all gamete
donors and recipients,239 there is no reason this should not extend to intended
parents, as ASRM’s guidelines mandate that “psychological consultation should be
required in individuals in whom there appear to be factors that warrant further
evaluation.”240 However, these evaluations should not be used as an automatic bar
on intended parents’ entering surrogacy contracts; an automatic bar would lead to
discrimination and impermissible denials of access.241 Even if the intended parents
would be able to procreate naturally, their ability to do so through surrogacy is not
a given.242 The key to a surrogacy agreement is the surrogate, who should be able
to make an informed decision before agreeing to an enforceable surrogacy contract.
C. Compensation
The proposals would permit intended parents to compensate surrogates above
and beyond costs associated with pregnancy, as long as compensation is reasonable
and negotiated in good-faith,243 and however the promised payment should be
guaranteed.

237. A similar requirement is already in place in New Hampshire. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 168-B:18 (2013). Virginia requires medical and psychological reports be accessible to all
parties. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(B)(7) (2013). For example, a surrogate may be interested
in knowing the environment in which the child she would carry will be raised. Cf.
Huddleston v. Infertility Ctr. of Am., 700 A.2d 453, 460 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (holding that
a prima facie case of negligence existed against surrogacy clinic that failed to evaluate
intended father’s psychological state and the child was murdered by the intended father).
Screening intended parents could identify potential dangers and prevent tragedies by
permitting informed surrogates to decide against providing services to questionable intended
parents. CROCKIN & JONES, supra note 1, at 239. Further, testing could reduce the number of
surrogates that seek custody of children they carried. See Stephanie Saul, Building a Baby,
with Few Ground Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2009, at A1.
238. See Huddleston, 700 A.2d at 460 (“[A] business operating for the sole purpose of
organizing and supervising the very delicate process of creating a child, which reaps
handsome profits from such endeavor, must be held accountable for the foreseeable risks of
the surrogacy undertaking because a ‘special relationship’ exists between the surrogacy
business, its client-participants, and, most especially, the child which the surrogacy
undertaking creates.”).
239. CROCKIN & JONES, supra note 1, at 132.
240. Id. at 133. Couples who learn that they need to use the contribution of others to
achieve pregnancy often become quite upset, including experiencing “a major crisis,”
depression, “a blow to their self-esteem,” or guilt. Cf. MACHELLE M. SEIBEL & SUSAN
CROCKIN, FAMILY BUILDING THROUGH EGG AND SPERM DONATION: MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND
ETHICAL ISSUES 35 (1996).
241. CROCKIN & JONES, supra note 1, at 362.
242. Without the voluntary acquiescence of a surrogate, the intended parents are unable
to pursue a child through surrogacy.
243. Assem. B. 6701 § 581-502(b) (N.Y. 2013). Notably, the Center for Surrogate
Parenting pays its surrogates between $20,000 and $30,000 per pregnancy, with experienced
surrogates receiving higher fees. Steiner, supra note 12.
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Society allows people to purchase services every day; surrogacy is another
service to be purchased.244 We already use skilled or manual labor as means to an
end in various aspects of our lives, often with no objection.245 It is acceptable to
hire a nurse for the sick, an aide for the infirm, and a sitter for children. A surrogate
should be treated equivalently to a paid caretaker.246 Morally, there is no difference
between paying a nanny to care for a toddler for a year and paying a woman to
gestate a fetus for nine months. In both cases, a parent is paying someone to
provide care, including feeding and protecting the child; in both cases it is possible
for the caretaker to emotionally invest in and develop an attachment to the charge.
We even permit men to sell sperm and women to sell eggs. We do not require these
individuals provide these materials from the goodness of their hearts; we allow
compensation above and beyond the costs for retrieval. It logically follows that we
should permit women to use their biological capability to help others procreate
while increasing their own welfare.247
Though surrogates may undertake the process and associated risks for altruistic
or personal reasons,248 they deserve compensation above and beyond reasonable
costs because they are performing a unique service.249 The surrogacy process is not
speedy. Women that undertake this labor of love deserve to have their time and
effort compensated.250 Further, they should be compensated for the risks they
undertake.251 The proposals explicitly permit surrogates’ compensation based on

244. See van Niekerk & van Zyl, supra note 8, at 346.
245. See id. For example, the relationship between a surrogate and the intended parents is
comparable to other contractually held jobs: a police officer and the village government; or a
professional athlete and the team for which he plays. In all cases, the employee contracts
away some control over his or her body for the benefit of others to achieve the goals agreed
to at the contract’s signing. See Arneson, supra note 7, at 161. Regulation of surrogacy, such
as in the manner suggested here, would operate similarly to laws regulating the workplace.
See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1910 (OSHA regulates workplaces).
246. See Callman, supra note 28, at 278.
247. See Watson, supra note 207, at 545–46; ASRM Opinion, supra note 191, at 1839
(noting that permitting compensated surrogacy arrangements is consistent with permitting
paid gamete donation).
248. Overwhelmingly, surrogate mothers volunteer for altruistic reasons. While money
may be a factor for some, few cite financial gain as the main reason why they volunteered.
Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 9, at 30. Surrogates empathize with the intended parents
and want to help them become parents. Id. Some surrogates pursue surrogacy as a way to
improve themselves—some seek to increase self-esteem; some suffered a previous
pregnancy-related loss and seek wholeness; some want to be pregnant again, seeking
pregnancy, but not another child. Id.
249. Caster, supra note 5, at 498; Belkin, supra note 101, at B3.
250. Belkin, supra note 101, at B3. Surrogate Mother Program, Inc., a surrogacy
brokerage firm, had a standard protocol that required monitoring the potential surrogates for
half a year to ensure their fitness. Id. It is not unreasonable to believe such precautions could
become the industry standard.
251. ASRM Opinion, supra note 191, at 1839 (“Payment to the gestational carriers
should take into account 9 months of possible illness, risks to employment, burdens on other
family members, and the like, but should not, however, create undue inducement or risks of
exploitation or incentivize gestational carriers to lie about their own health conditions or
family history.”).
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financial costs, inconvenience, and time.252
Placing the payment in an escrow account prior to the start of IVF ensures
surrogates receive the promised compensation, protecting against exploitation.253
Because payments must conclude within two months of the pregnancy’s end, funds
would not be used to purchase an interest in a child.254 To assuage concerns that the
fee is being used to buy children, compensation should be disbursed to the
surrogate throughout the pregnancy.255 This would further support the statutory
suggestion that compensation be based on the time spent, the inconvenience
caused, and the costs accumulated.256
D. Contractual Requirements
The legislative proposals set out reasonable requirements for enforcement of
surrogacy contracts, however enforcement should be expanded to include
traditional surrogacy agreements. Requiring the contract be in writing is a logical
way to protect all parties,257 and is not overly burdensome.258 Requiring the
contract be signed by all parties259 prior to the cycle similarly protects the parties so
that they enter the contract voluntarily and not due to guilt or coercion. Requiring
the surrogate to choose her medical practitioners preserves her autonomy and
privacy. The other proposed substantive requirements are unremarkable.260
Notably, the proposals only sanction gestational surrogacy contracts.261 This
will satisfy most intended parents, but the legislature should sanction commercial
traditional surrogacy contracts as well. While gestational surrogacy has increased
in popularity,262 some intended parents prefer to forgo the intended mother’s

252. Assem. B. 6701 § 581-502(a) (N.Y. 2013). This is an appropriate, albeit flexible,
formula for calculating surrogates’ compensation. See Watson, supra note 207, at 551–52
(“Surrogacy is a twenty-four hour per day job that lasts for nine months. The job involves
danger to the woman’s life and health. There is no vacation time from this job, and there are
few tangible job perks. Clearly, surrogates deserve compensation for their services.”).
253. ASRM Opinion, supra note 191, at 1839. Use of an escrow account also protects the
intended parents by separating the financial incentive from their interactions with the
surrogate. Id.
254. Assem. B. 6701§ 581-502(a) (N.Y. 2013).
255. See Caster, supra note 5, at 513.
256. Assem. B. 6701 § 581-502(a) (N.Y. 2013).
257. Requiring the contract be written is not unique to the New York proposal. See, e.g.,
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/15 (2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-801(1) (2013); VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-160(A) (2010).
258. Compare Assem. B. 6701 § 581-405(a)(1) (N.Y. 2013) with VA. CODE ANN. § 20160(A)-(B) (requiring a hearing on the merits of the surrogacy contract, a court-appointed
guardian ad litem for the resulting child, and a home study for both parties before approving
the agreement and permitting the procedures to commence).
259. Requiring a married surrogate’s husband to be a party to the contract avoids the
presumption of paternity for the resulting child. This is codified in other states’ surrogacy
laws. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(B)(10).
260. For example, the proposals require the contract to clearly assign obligations to all
parties and the parties to be independently represented.
261. See Assem. B. 6701 § 581-103(m)–(o) (N.Y. 2013).
262. See Scott, supra note 14, at 122, 139.

26

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL SUPPLEMENT

[Vol. 90:1

genetic connection to the child to improve their odds for a successful pregnancy.263
Others prefer traditional surrogacy because it costs much less than gestational
surrogacy.264 Also, conceptually, it is strange to allow egg donation for profit and
to allow gestational surrogacy for profit but not to allow the combination of
services. It is arbitrary to limit enforcement to gestational surrogacy contracts.
Women willing to enter traditional surrogacy contracts are still the best judges of
what they are able and willing to undertake.265 Enforcement of traditional
surrogacy arrangements should be permitted under the legislative proposals.
E. Legal Parentage
The other major change endorsed by the proposed legislation is to permit
“judgments of parentage” prior to birth of children born to surrogates.266 While the
formal requirements laid out in the proposals are fairly unremarkable,267 the end
result is not: at birth the child’s legal parents are the intended parents, who
immediately get custody without adoption by the intended mother.
Determining parentage under a surrogacy contract is incredibly important; it is
unwise to enter such agreements without parentage being enforceable at the
outset.268 Parents have a constitutionally protected interest in developing and
maintaining relationships with their children.269 Similarly, most states guarantee

263. The miscarriage rate is higher when the carrier is not related to the embryo. See
Caster, supra note 5, at 481.
264. The average cost of traditional surrogacy is $50,000, which is less than half the
average cost of gestational surrogacy, which averages between $120,000–$140,000. See
Surrogacy: What to Expect, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/resources/
entry/surrogacy-what-to-expect.
265. This would however make medical examinations more important. Sperm being used
for intrauterine insemination should be screened to protect surrogates from exposure to
sexually transmitted diseases. See Walker, supra note 228, at 126. Further, a “special
relationship” exists between the ART clinic and the surrogate, in which it has a duty of care
to look out for her health and well-being. See Stiver v. Parker, 975 F.2d 261, 268–71 (6th Cir.
1992).
266. Assemb. B. 6701 §§ 581-201(c)(ii), 203 (N.Y. 2013).
267. The proposals basically ensure that New York has jurisdiction over the contract, that
the statutory eligibility and enforceability requirements are met, and that the contract was
entered voluntarily. Id. § 581-203(b)(1)–(3).
268. Without the agreement being enforceable at the outset, neither the intended parents
nor the surrogate has a guaranteed incentive, and thus will be more hesitant. Posner, supra
note 210, at 23; CROCKIN & JONES, supra note 1, at 216. Legal and social parental status
should be determined by the contract and its parties’ intentions at formation. Scott, supra
note 14, at 122. If the law does not safeguard the parties’ intentions, the results can prove
disastrous—namely, custodial disputes (or anxiety about that possibility), can lead to horrific
consequences for the intended parents. See Scott, supra note , at 123. If parentage is not able
to be determined before the child’s birth, peculiar things can happen. For example, a child
could end up having no legal mother, no legal father, or no legal parents. Bonnie Steinbock,
Defining Parenthood, in FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY IN REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE 107, 108
(J.R. Spencer & Anteje Du Bois-Pedain, eds. 2006).
269. David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions Between Legal,
Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 128 (2006)
(referencing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)). A Utah law prohibiting surrogacy
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children the right to legally recognized relationships with their parents.270 “By
allowing the intended parents to be listed on their children’s birth certificates, they
can avoid unnecessary litigation regarding parentage, custody or even intestacy
rights.”271 Immediately listing the intended parents reflects the legal and social
reality of parenthood, the parties’ intentions, and thus would decrease anxiety and
uncertainty for the intended parents.272 Birth certificates are legal documents,
maintained and created as proscribed by law; they are not governed by biology or
genetics, so they should simply reflect legal reality.273 The law should respect the
parties’ intentions and enforce their decisions on parental roles.
Without the surrogacy contract, the resulting child would not exist; the child
was intentionally conceived at the behest of the intended parents.274 That is the
reason adoption is inadequate and inappropriate.275 This is something the
legislative proposals recognize: where intended parents do not pursue and obtain a
judgment of parentage under the statute, the court assigns legal parentage based on
“the best interests of the child,”276 informed by “genetics and the intent of the
parties.”277
contracts was found unconstitutional because the law interfered with the biological parents’
“fundamental liberty interest[] in their parental relationship with their children.” J.R. v.
Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1297 (D. Utah 2003); CROCKIN & JONES, supra note 1, at 257.
270. Meyer, supra note 269, at 129.
271. Caster, supra note 5, 494–95.
272. Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 9, at 40.
273. Caster, supra note 5, at 495. Even New York’s Task Force on Life and the Law
relatively recently recommended that the law should provide an efficient manner for
enforcing the intent of the parties to a surrogacy contract with regards to legal parentage.
TASK FORCE, supra note 26.
274. Arneson, supra note 7, at 157. It is this intent that should control. Legal- and
biological-parentage are not equivalents, in either law or reality. TASK FORCE, supra note 26.
For example, New York law assigns legal paternity to a woman’s husband when she is
inseminated with another man’s sperm. Id.
275. The legislative scheme surrounding adoption is inappropriate to regulate parentage
of children resulting from surrogacy. The obvious—and major—difference is that in
adoption there already exists a child, whose birth parents have rights that need to be
terminated. Children resulting from surrogacy only exist because of the executed agreement
and the parental rights should vest only in the intended parents. Oftentimes, without the
explicit direction of law, biological parents face the adoption process for their own children
or can be unable to establish their biological/legal connection with their children. See
CROCKIN & JONES, supra note 1, at 234. Without a legislative prescription like that described
in the proposals, parents face a long legal process to get their names printed on their
children’s birth certificates. Id. at 235.
276. Assem. B. 6701 § 581-408 (N.Y. 2013).
277. Id. Other outcomes may violate the Equal Protection Clause. An Arizona statute was
violative of the Equal Protection Clause when it allowed fathers to prove paternity but
prevented mothers from proving maternity. CROCKIN & JONES, supra note 1, at 237.
Surrogates were presumed to be the mothers of the children they birthed, while their
husbands could be proven not to be the fathers. Id. Similarly, Maryland found that, under
principles of Equal Protection, a woman can deny maternity, just as a man can deny
paternity of a child. Id. at 269; In re Roberto D.B., 923 A.2d 115, 123–24 (Md. 2007).
Interestingly, an increasing number of states permit unmarried men to challenge the
paternity of married women’s children, even over those women’s husbands, in order to
establish legal recognition of their biological connection. Meyer, supra note 269. Equal
protection demands that women be afforded this same ability.
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F. Termination
The proposals provide that for resolving disputes and for terminating a
surrogacy contract, “all remedies available at law or equity” are available, except
specific performance when it requires the surrogate become pregnant,278 however
they do not provide a framework for resolving major disputes between the intended
parents and the surrogate: the bills are silent on what should become of the money
or the fetus if anyone wants to terminate the agreement after embryo transfer and
judgment of parentage. This flexibility is a double-edged sword.
While specific performance cannot be ordered to impregnate the surrogate,
courts could order specific performance of lifestyle clauses forcing the surrogate to
refrain from activities that could negatively impact the fetus (such as drinking,
smoking, or using drugs), or to engage in behavior that could positively impact the
fetus (such as eating better, taking prenatal vitamins, or taking folic acid).279
Despite, or even because, the intended parents pledge to accept all children
regardless of “mental or physical condition” resulting from the arrangement, many
contracts will provide an obligation for the surrogate to undergo prenatal testing
and to abort if the intended parents determine the fetus has an abnormality they find
unacceptable.280 Enforceability of such a clause is questionable under Roe v.
Wade,281 however, refusal to comply could still lead to litigation, 282 as it is possible
neither surrogate nor intended parents would want the offspring.283 Another
possibility would be that the intended parents would be willing to parent, but would
seek damages from the surrogate.284
This silence may be intended to provide courts with the most flexibility
permissible. With this flexibility, courts are able to adjudicate more equitably,
especially as they are not bound by precedent.285 However, intended parents would
likely be more comfortable knowing that their investment would be protected if the
agreement went irreparably sour.286 While many parties to surrogacy arrangements
may benefit from flexible regulation, more thorough legislative guidance would
better protect their interests.

278. Assem. B. 6701 § 581-409(a)–(c) (N.Y. 2013).
279. See BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 26, at 129.
280. Id. at 117.
281. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (explaining that the right to privacy ensures that the
decision to undergo an abortion is made by the pregnant woman).
282. See, e.g., Elizabeth Cohen, Surrogate Offered $10,000 to Abort Baby, CNN (Mar. 6,
2013),
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/03/04/health/surrogacy-kelley-legal-battle/index.html
(describing circumstances where, despite the surrogate contract requiring “abortion in case
of severe fetus abnormality,” the surrogate refused to abort a fetus with abnormalities).
283. BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 26, at 117 (describing two cases where children
resulting from surrogacy agreements were rejected by both the intended parents and the
surrogate because of congenital problems).
284. See id. at 129.
285. Assem. B. 6701 § 581-410 (N.Y. 2013) (requiring all “proceedings, records, and
identities of the individual parties” be sealed unless petitioned by the parties or the resulting
child).
286. Notably, less than one percent of surrogacy contracts end in dispute. John Dwight
Ingram, Surrogate Gestator: A New and Honorable Profession, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 675, 689
(1993).
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CONCLUSION
After over twenty years of status quo, the New York Legislature has an
opportunity to liberalize its surrogacy laws whether during this legislative session
or the next. By adopting the proposals with the suggested changes, the Legislature
would simultaneously bring the law into conformity with the desires of many New
Yorkers and recognize important technological developments. The proposals are
marked improvements on the present prohibitory regime; however, they are not
perfect. The legislature should consider further protections for the parties to
surrogacy arrangements and amend the proposals accordingly. The legislature’s
renewed interest in the topic is refreshing; this interest should lead to major
legislative overhaul in the near future.

